Perception, Senses and Action Forum: Colour as a superficial kind

24 May 2012, 16:00 - 18:00

Speakers Abstract:

On the view of colour as a natural kind, colour terms rigidly designate properties with complex (micro-)physical essences, in the way that ‘water’ is standardly taken to rigidly designate H20. This paper considers an alternative view of colours and colour terms, according to which colour terms rigidly designate superficial properties of objects. After arguing that the view of colours as superficial kinds is preferable to the view of colours as natural kinds, I defend the view that colour terms rigidly designate superficial kinds in response to challenges from semantic internalism and conventionalism.

Speakers:
Keith Allen (York)
Organised by:
Institute of Philosophy
Event Type:
Seminar
Venue:
STB9 (Stewart House, basement)
Venue Details:

Stewart House
University of London
32 Russell Square 
London WC1B 5DN

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